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*
This paper uses vector autoregressions to examine the monetary transmission
mechanism in Japan. The empirical results indicate that both monetary policy and
banks’balance sheets are important sources of shocks, that banks play a crucial
role in transmitting monetary shocks to economic activity, that corporations and
households have not been able to substitute borrowing from other sources for a
shortfall in bank borrowing, and that business investment is especially sensitive to
monetary shocks. We conclude that policy measures to strengthen banks are prob-
ably a prerequisite to restoring the effectiveness of the monetary transmission
mechanism. [JEL E50, E51]
T
he mechanism for the transmission of monetary policy changes to real
activity—the famous “black box”—is always a subject of lively interest to
economists. Many channels have been identified, including interest rates, the
exchange rate, inflationary expectations (higher expected inflation lowers the real
interest rate), bank lending, balance sheet effects, and wealth effects, but there is
little agreement on either their precise workings or their relative importance (see
Mishkin, 1995).
When an economy is in a recession, such as Japan is experiencing currently,
monetary policy and the channels of monetary transmission receive particular
scrutiny. In the case of Japan, two further factors make understanding the trans-
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mission mechanism especially important. First, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) has
steadily lowered the overnight call rate—the operating target for monetary
policy—to “as low as possible,” which turns out to be 0.03 percent given transac-
tions costs. With monetary policy bumping up against the nominal floor on
interest rates, and attention shifting to a possible role for quantitative easing,
examining the monetary transmission mechanism may provide some insight into
the effectiveness of policies in this unusual environment. 
Second, the 1990s slump in activity has been accompanied by a banking
crisis. A growing body of research focuses on the bank lending channel of the
monetary transmission mechanism (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; and
Kashyap and Stein, 1997). Banks are seen as playing an important independent
role in overcoming information problems and other frictions in credit markets,
so that some borrowers (small firms, for example) cannot readily find substi-
tutes for bank financing. As a result, changes to banks’ ability to lend—either
reflecting monetary policy developments or other changes to bank capital and
funding—are transmitted to bank-dependent borrowers. As banks play a partic-
ularly important role in Japan’s financial intermediation,1 the banking channel
may be of particular significance as a conduit for monetary policy and, given the
problems being experienced by the banking sector, as an independent source of
real disturbances.2
This paper uses vector autoregressions (VARs) to examine the monetary
transmission mechanism in Japan. This methodology allows us to place
minimal restrictions on how monetary shocks affect the economy, which—
given the lack of consensus about the workings of the monetary transmission
mechanism—is a distinct advantage. In addition, this approach recognizes
explicitly the simultaneity between monetary policy and macroeconomic
developments, that is, the dependence of monetary policy on other economic
variables (the policy reaction function), as well as the dependence of economic
variables on monetary policy. The choice of a VAR approach is also inspired
by the existence of a large empirical literature using VARs to examine the
monetary transmission mechanism in the United States, which focuses
primarily on reduced-form relationships between monetary policy and output
using a small number of variables (for a survey, see Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Evans, 1999). Compared to that literature, we look in more detail at the
mechanics of the monetary transmission mechanism. The closest antecedent to
this paper in the U.S. literature is Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996), which also
explores the workings of the transmission mechanism.
1By contrast, the wealth channel may be relatively unimportant in Japan given the limited ownership
of equities by individuals.
2Two different views of the banking crisis are contained in the literature. Krugman (1998) argues that
bank weakness has had little impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy as impaired banks tend to
lend too much, not too little. By contrast, Bayoumi (1999) finds that the negative shocks to bank lending,
either autonomous or caused by falling asset prices, provided a major deflationary impetus over the 1990s.I. Econometric Methodology and Data
Our basic model includes economic activity, prices, interest rates, and broad
money.3 Our measure of economic activity is real private demand (real GDP minus
total government spending), because public sector demand is driven primarily by
fiscal policy, which is assumed to be exogenous.4 We express private demand as a
ratio to potential output, because it is widely recognized that potential growth in
Japan slowed sharply between the 1980s and the 1990s, and we do not want this
phenomenon to influence our results—our focus is the impact of monetary events
on the cyclical behavior of real private demand. We use the IMF’s measure of
potential output, which is based on a Cobb-Douglas production function. (For a
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of this measure, see Bayoumi,
1999.) The price level is given by the natural logarithm of the consumer price
index, while real broad money (M2 + CDs) is divided by potential output, so that
responses can be easily converted into policy multipliers.5 The use of potential
output to scale real private demand and real broad money is not critical to the
results—estimation using the logarithms of activity and money yielded similar
results.6
Our measure of the stance of monetary policy in Japan is the (uncollateral-
ized) overnight call rate, the current operating target of policy. Although both the
instruments and operating objectives of the Bank of Japan have evolved over
time, mostly reflecting the development of financial markets, several authors
have noted that monetary policy has consistently laid a strong emphasis on short-
term interest rates. For example, Okina (1993) states that the Bank of Japan’s
policy  “always begins with controlling interest rates in short-term money
markets.”7 Other recent work on monetary policy in Japan, such as Kwon (1998)
and Ogawa (1999), has also focussed on the overnight call rate. Other short-term
interest rates, such as the Gensaki (repurchase of government securities) rate,
closely track the call rate.
In addition to a constant term and a time trend, the VAR also includes two
dummy variables aimed at capturing the short-term shifting of demand seen in the
quarter before and the quarter after the introduction of the consumption tax in
April 1989 and its increase in April 1997, with each variable designed so that the
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3The inclusion of the real effective exchange rate yields similar results for these variables and
plausible results for the exchange rate. Given that Japan—like the U.S.—is a relatively closed
economy and that the exchange rate channel is not the focus of this paper, we omit the exchange rate
from subsequent models.
4An alternative interpretation is that the multiplier on government spending is unity, a value used in
other IMF work (Lipworth and Meredith, 1998), although recent empirical work has pointed to a some-
what lower value (Bayoumi, 1999).
5The data sources are provided in Appendix I. Since activity and money are measured as ratios to
potential output, prices are in logarithms, and the nominal interest rate is a ratio, a change of 0.01 repre-
sents a 1 percentage point change in the relevant variable.
6For other recent empirical work using this approach, see Bayoumi (1999).
7See also Singleton (1993) and Ueda (1993) in the same volume. Kasa and Popper (1997), who use
a structural VAR approach to study the objectives and operating procedures of the BOJ, also conclude that
short rates are important.impacts sum to zero over time. The VAR is estimated with quarterly, seasonally-
adjusted data from 1980Q1 to 1998Q3 using two lags—the results are similar
when we start the estimation a few years earlier or later, or use different lags.
The VAR is identified using a Choleski decomposition, with the ordering
being private demand, prices, the overnight call rate, and broad money. As the
reduced-form errors are typically correlated, the Choleski decomposition isolates
the underlying structural errors by recursive orthogonalization, with the innova-
tion in the first equation untransformed, the innovation in the second equation
taken as orthogonal to the first, and so on. The ordering determines the level of
exogeneity of the variables, so current shocks to activity are assumed independent
of current shocks to all the other variables in the system, while current shocks to
money are assumed to be affected by current shocks to all other variables.
The ordering was chosen on the basis of the speed with which the variables
respond to shocks, with output assumed to be the least responsive, followed by
prices, then short rates, and finally broad money. Given the time-consuming plan-
ning processes involved in setting output and prices, these variables are assumed
not to react to contemporaneous shocks to financial variables. The monetary
authorities are assumed to set the call rate with information about the contempo-
raneous behavior of slowly-moving output and prices, but without a full picture of
the behavior of quickly-changing financial variables. Broad money—and, in the
extended VARs, funding or lending aggregates—are assumed to reflect contem-
poraneous shocks to output, prices, and monetary policy. Although we did not esti-
mate all possible alternative orderings, the results were similar for some radical
re-orderings (in particular, completely reversing the ordering to be money, interest
rate, prices, and activity). Alternative orderings are also discussed regularly in the
discussion of the extended VARs.
While Choleski decompositions are a common method of identifying a VAR,
other methods, which assume two-way contemporaneous feedback between some
elements of the VAR, have also been developed. Such methods have been used to
help identify monetary VARs of the type we are estimating (using U.S. data),
although we did not utilize such an approach for two reasons. First, a survey of the
monetary VAR literature by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) finds
considerable agreement about the qualitative effects of monetary policy across a
large subset of the identification schemes that have been proposed. Second, the
cost of more complex approaches, in which the contemporaneous relationships
between variables are more simultaneous, is that the identification scheme
becomes more complicated without necessarily becoming less controversial.
Given the robustness of our results to relatively radical re-orderings of the under-
lying variables, we focussed only on Choleski decompositions.
We then extend the VAR in a number of different directions to examine alter-
native aspects of the monetary transmission mechanism. To analyze the sensitivity
of different components of private demand to monetary shocks, we split private
demand into its main components: private consumption, business investment,
housing investment, and net exports. For each component (say, private consump-
tion), we estimate a VAR with the following ordering: total private demand minus
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25the component of interest, the demand component of interest, prices, the overnight
call rate, and broad money.
To investigate the role of financial intermediation in the monetary transmission
mechanism, we extend the basic VAR by including the main components of private
sector funding. Specifically, we add loans received by corporations and individuals
from public financial institutions, loans from private financial institutions (essen-
tially bank loans), and funds raised in securities markets. Public financial institu-
tions, such as the Housing Loan Corporation, the Japan Development Bank, and the
Finance Corporation for Small Business, support policy objectives by providing
subsidized loans. While the supply of public loans is thus partly exogenous, both
the demand and supply of public loans also react to shocks to the variables included
in our model. We order public loans before securities markets and bank loans on
the assumption that bureaucratic processes are generally slower than private sector
processes. It turns out that the results are similar for different orderings.
Next, to further examine the role of banks in the monetary transmission mech-
anism, we incorporate the two main components of bank assets: loans and hold-
ings of securities. Securities holdings are ordered last, reflecting the relative ease
with which they can be adjusted. If, as we suspect, shocks to bank assets turn out
to be important in causing output variations, how should we think about them, as
distinct from interest rate and money shocks? One possibility, suggested by the
literature on the credit crunch, is that shocks to bank loans reflect changes in
banks’ capital strength (see Ito and Sasaki, 1998, and Woo, 1999). For example,
an unexpected improvement in bank strength might cause banks to extend more
loans. To test this hypothesis, we add a market-based indicator of bank strength—
bank stock prices relative to overall stock prices—to the bank credit VAR.8
Finally, we estimate a single VAR that we feel captures the key elements of the
monetary transmission mechanism. As business investment turns out to be much
more sensitive to monetary shocks than other components of private demand, we
run the VAR with private demand split into business investment and the remainder.
We then include the other basic variables—prices, overnight call rate, and broad
money. As our investigation of the transmission channel from the perspectives of
both borrowers (private sector funding) and lender (bank assets) revealed the
important role played by bank loans to the private sector, we include this variable.
II. Empirical Results
Basic Monetary Model 
The basic model, which includes private demand, prices, interest rates, and money,
provides four important results relevant to the monetary transmission mechanism:
(i) interest rate shocks have significant effects on real private demand, consistent
James Morsink and Tamim Bayoumi
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8The stock price index for the banking sector from the Tokyo Stock Exchange is available starting in
1983, truncating the sample period. The variable is normalized to unity over the sample period, so that
changes have the interpretation of percentage deviations. This variable was ordered last in the VAR, given
that market prices generally respond quickly to all types of shocks.with an important role for monetary policy; (ii) broad money shocks also have
significant effects on output, even though interest rates are included in the model,
consistent with the idea that nonpolicy monetary shocks are also important in
determining economic activity; (iii) much of the effect of interest rate shocks on
output is transmitted through broad money; and (iv) base money has no significant
impact on output.
The results from the basic model are illustrated through the model’s impulse
response functions reported in Figure 1.9An unexpected rise in short-term interest
rates causes a statistically significant decline in private demand, which bottoms
out after 8–10 quarters. The implied multiplier for the interest rate is minus 0.6,
calculated as the ratio of the fall in output (0.3 percent) to a typical interest rate
shock (0.5 percent).10 A broad money shock also causes a significant increase in
private demand, with a ¥100 increase in broad money raising real private demand
by ¥80. The fact that a money shock has a large impact on economic activity, even
when the interest rate is included as a separate variable in the VAR (that is, we
control for interest rates), is consistent with the idea that the interest rate channel
alone does not fully account for the sources and transmission of monetary shocks
in Japan.
The price level responds positively to an interest rate innovation, apparently
suggesting that a monetary contraction produces inflation. This latter result is
commonly found in the empirical literature on the monetary transmission mecha-
nism in the United States and has been dubbed the “price puzzle.” As noted by
Sims (1992), the price puzzle could be a consequence of failing to include a rich
enough specification of the information available to policymakers. If policymakers
can observe variables that contain useful information about future inflation, but
those variables are not included in the model, there will be apparently unpre-
dictable changes in interest rates that are actually systematic responses to infor-
mation implying that inflation is on the way.11
Interest rates rise in response to price shocks but are relatively insensitive to
private demand shocks, consistent with the BOJ’s emphasis on price stability. The
fact that interest rates do not respond to real private demand innovations, but
private demand responds negatively to interest rate innovations, suggests that
simultaneity in the determination of these variables may not be a serious problem.
The combination of positive interest rate and output responses to broad money
innovations could reflect the predominance of favorable real shocks that are not
fully accommodated. Another possible explanation is that money (supply) shocks
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9Detailed results for this VAR and the others reported in the paper are contained in Appendix II,
including two-standard-error bands around the impulse responses. The analytic asymptotic standard errors
are computed according to the formula given in Hamilton (1994, page 339). Similar results were obtained
using Monte Carlo standard errors.
10This multiplier is similar to that obtained by Bayoumi (1999), who uses a VAR methodology with
a different set of variables, although only about half of that obtained by Lipworth and Meredith (1998),
who use the Japan block of the IMF’s MULTIMOD model, and at the lower end of the range of estimates
from large econometric models presented by Krugman (1998).
11The introduction of commodity prices reduces this source of bias in empirical work on the United
States (see, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1996). However, neither commodity prices
































8 Figure 1.  Japan: Impulse Response Functions for the Basic Model
(Response to one S.D. innovations)
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0are indicative of future inflation, consistent with the price level’s positive response
to money shocks. Finally, broad money responds negatively to interest rate inno-
vations (tighter monetary policy) and price level innovations (adverse aggregate
supply shocks), and positively (but not significantly) to real private demand inno-
vations, consistent with standard views on the behavior of money demand.
To get an idea of the share of the fluctuations in a given variable that are
caused by different shocks, we calculate variance decompositions for each vari-
able at forecast horizons of one through four years (Table 1). The second column
in each sub-table gives the forecast error of the variable for each forecast
horizon.12 The remaining columns give the percentage of the variance due to each
shock—each row adds up to 100. The results indicate that, after two years, mone-
tary factors (both interest rate and broad money shocks) account for over half of
the fluctuation in private demand, while own shocks account for less than one third
of such variance—a significantly lower value than for any other variable in the
VAR. Interest rate innovations alone account for about 20 percent of the variance
in private demand after two years—similar to empirical results for the U.S.
economy. In short, monetary factors appear to be very important determinants of
fluctuations in economic activity.
The significant influence of broad money on private demand suggests that it
may be an important channel for transmitting changes in interest rates. To examine
this issue, we reran the VAR with broad money exogenized, i.e., the lagged values
of broad money are treated as exogenous variables in a smaller VAR involving
private demand, prices, and the interest rate (Appendix III). Such a procedure
generates a VAR identical to the original, except that it blocks off any responses
within the VAR which pass through the broad money variable, hence comparisons
of the responses of the two models provide a measure of the importance of money
in the transmission mechanism. Comparing the two impulse responses of real
private demand to interest rate innovations (Figure 2), it is clear that the money
supply is an important conduit for the impact of interest rates on real activity.13
To examine the interest rate channel more closely, we extended the VAR by
adding the interest rate on new bank loans (ordered last). We find that the lending
rate responds immediately and strongly to an unexpected change in the overnight
call rate. In turn, private demand and broad money respond negatively and signif-
icantly to lending rate shocks. These results point to an interest rate channel that
originates in the policy interest rate and goes through the bank lending rate and
bank balance sheets (including broad money) to affect private demand.
Thus far, we have assumed that monetary policy only acts through interest rates,
not through the quantity of high powered money (“quantitative easing”). To address
the issue of whether base money is also important for aggregate demand when
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12The source of the forecast error is the variation in current and future values of the innovations to
each variable in the VAR.
13Since broad money is roughly equivalent to the liabilities of the banking system, this result also
suggests that banks in particular may play an important role in the transmission mechanism. This is further
supported by other results (not reported for the sake of brevity) in which M2 was divided into M1 and
quasi-money. The results from this model indicate that it is quasi-money (time and savings deposits) rather
than M1 (currency and demand deposits) that primarily affects real demand.interest rates are held constant, we added base money to the basic model.14 The
impulse response of real demand to base money is small and insignificant—a typical
money base shock raises real private demand by less than 0.1 percent. In addition,
adding base money has no perceptible impact on either the size or significance of the
James Morsink and Tamim Bayoumi
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14The equation for base money is ordered second to last (before broad money but after the short-term
interest rate to account for the impact of interest rate changes on base money). The results are similar if
base money is ordered last.
Table 1. Japan: Variance Decompositions for the Basic Monetary Model
(In percent)
Variance Decomposition of Private Demand
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money
4 1.1 68.6 1.8 12.2 17.3
8 1.6 33.6 10.0 18.9 37.6
12 2.1 21.0 14.6 20.6 43.9
16 2.3 17.1 15.7 21.1 46.1
Variance Decomposition of Price Level
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money
4 0.7 5.2 86.8 6.2 1.7
8 0.9 11.8 79.8 6.6 1.8
12 1.0 13.3 69.7 6.7 10.4
16 1.1 10.6 57.4 9.4 22.6
Variance Decomposition of Interest Rates
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money
4 1.0 1.2 21.6 76.8 0.5
8 1.1 1.2 23.1 61.0 14.7
12 1.4 2.3 27.5 46.3 23.8
16 1.5 3.2 28.2 42.6 26.0
Variance Decomposition of Broad Money
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money
4 2.1 0.5 16.4 7.4 75.8
8 3.7 1.4 22.6 14.0 62.0
12 4.4 2.2 23.3 16.2 58.3
16 4.7 2.5 22.8 16.8 57.9
Source: Authors’calculations.response of aggregate demand to broad money. This suggests that, at least in normal
circumstances, quantitative easing may have only limited effects on activity.
Components of Private Demand 
The first experiment we conduct is to examine which components of real private
demand are most affected by monetary policy. This is accomplished by rerunning
the basic model with real private demand split between the particular component
being examined and the remainder of private demand (ordered first to avoid
spurious correlations).15 For business investment, for example, the VAR involves
private demand less business investment, business investment, prices, the
overnight call rate, and broad money.
Figure 3 shows the response of the individual demand components to a change
in interest rates and a change in broad money. The results indicate that monetary
policy operates on the real economy largely through its impact on business invest-
ment. A typical innovation in the overnight call rate changes business investment
by over 0.2 percentage points of potential output after 2
1⁄2 years, compared to 0.1
percentage points for household spending (the sum of consumption and residential
investment) and a negligible effect on net exports.16 The importance of business
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Figure 2.  Japan: Response of Real Private Demand to Interest Rates




15The components of private demand being consumption, business investment, residential investment,
exports, and imports.investment is consistent with the view that the bank lending channel dominates the
monetary transmission mechanism in Japan, as such investment is largely funded
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Figure 3.  Japan: Components of Private Demand






















Responses of Components of Private Demand to a Money Shock
16Note that the sum of these components—0.3 percent of potential—is very close to the result found
for total private demand in the basic model, indicating that the decomposition into separate components
of demand is broadly consistent with the aggregate results.out of bank lending, at least at the margin. Similar results are also found with regard
to broad money. Table 2, which reports the variance decompositions for the VAR
with business investment, shows that—after two years—monetary factors account
for over 50 percent of the fluctuation in business investment.
Private Sector Funding 
The second extension to the basic model involves adding the main components of
private sector funding: bank loans to corporations and households (hereafter
simply called bank loans), loans from government financial institutions to these
same sectors (henceforth, public loans), and funds raised by corporations through
securities markets.17 So the VAR comprises (in order) private demand, prices, the
overnight call rate, broad money, public loans, funds from securities markets, and
bank loans. As discussed further below, the following conclusions emerge: (i)
bank loans are both an important conduit for the monetary transmission mecha-
nism and a significant source of independent shocks to private demand, while
funds from securities markets and public loans have neither of these characteris-
tics; and (ii) innovations to bank loans elicit no significant response from securi-
ties markets or public loans (in other words, there is no effective substitute for
bank loans), while increases in public loans are almost entirely offset by subse-
quent reductions in bank loans and securities markets funding. Public loans substi-
tute for private credit, helping to explain why they have little impact on demand.
The addition of these private sector funding variables has almost no impact on
the responses within the basic model, with one important exception, namely that
the impact of the overnight rate on demand becomes insignificant (see Appendix
II). As this is the main transmission channel for monetary policy in the model, this
result would be important if it turned out to be robust. Further investigation indi-
cates, however, that this result is reversed when the series measuring funds raised
in securities markets is eliminated from the VAR. As this variable has very little
impact on the rest of the model, and this is the only case in which our monetary
VARs produce an insignificant interest rate response on output, we view this effect
as a statistical aberration.
Turning to the results for the three additional variables, the impulse responses
indicate that innovations to bank loans unconnected with interest rates and activity
have a large and significant impact on private demand, with a ¥100 increase in
bank loans leading to a ¥50 increase in real demand (Figure 4). By contrast, inde-
pendent increases in funds from securities markets or public loans have no signif-
icant impact on demand. In the case of securities markets, this appears to reflect
their limited importance in financial intermediation (comparing the size of own
responses, the typical innovation to credit from securities markets is only two-
fifths that of bank loans). For public loans, which are a more important component
of the financial transmission mechanism, the results show that a rise in public
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17These data come from the flow of funds accounts. The securities markets series aggregates funds
from bonds, corporate paper, and equities.James Morsink and Tamim Bayoumi
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Table 2. Japan: Variance Decompositions for the Business Investment Model
(In percent)
Variance Decomposition of Private Demand Minus Business Investment
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money
4 0.5 63.1 10.9 2.0 13.8 10.3
8 0.7 40.7 7.7 6.4 17.7 27.4
12 0.7 35.1 6.0 8.9 18.3 31.7
16 0.8 34.0 5.7 9.2 18.5 32.6
Variance Decomposition of Business Investment
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money
4 0.6 12.1 73.9 0.3 4.4 9.3
8 1.0 6.3 35.1 7.9 12.6 38.1
12 1.5 7.1 17.7 15.3 16.2 43.7
16 1.7 9.3 13.5 16.9 17.3 43.0
Variance Decomposition of Price Level
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money
4 0.7 8.1 0.8 84.2 5.9 1.0
8 0.9 12.4 3.5 76.3 6.6 1.2
12 1.0 11.8 5.8 66.7 6.4 9.3
16 1.1 10.0 5.5 54.5 8.9 21.1
Variance Decomposition of Interest Rates
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money
4 1.0 2.2 0.0 22.1 75.1 0.4
8 1.1 3.6 1.1 23.5 60.7 11.2
12 1.3 6.0 1.1 27.0 46.8 19.1
16 1.4 7.4 1.0 27.6 42.7 21.3
Variance Decomposition of Broad Money
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money
4 2.1 5.4 4.3 15.3 6.9 68.1
8 3.6 8.5 2.8 21.3 13.8 53.6
12 4.4 9.8 2.3 22.0 16.2 49.8
16 4.7 10.1 2.3 21.4 17.0 49.2
Source: Authors’calculations.loans is followed by reduction in privately-sourced funds. Furthermore, these
results are similar if different orderings of the three additional variables are used.
Figure 5 shows how the three new variables respond to each other, in other
words, the degree of substitution between different forms of private sector
funding. As can be seen in the bottom panel of the figure, an increase in bank loans
elicits no significant response from either securities markets or government finan-
cial institutions, implying that shocks to bank credit translate almost one-for-one
into lower borrowing by the private sector. By contrast, as can be seen in the top
panel, an increase in public loans is offset quite rapidly by reductions in bank
loans and credit from securities markets—public loans are generally a substitute
for private funds, not an addition to them. This very different set of responses
helps to explain why bank loans have a direct impact on demand, but public loans
do not. Table 3 presents the variance decompositions, which show that bank loans
account for about 10 percent of the fluctuation in private demand after two years.
The role of different sources of funds in the monetary transmission mecha-
nism was explored by rerunning the VAR with each of the funding variables being
exogenized in the same manner that broad money was exogenized earlier, so that
any responses involving these variables are eliminated. Exogenizing bank loans
leads to a dramatic reduction in the impact of broad money on private demand,
while exogenizing funds from securities markets and public sector loans produces
almost no change in this money effect, indicating that bank loans are the main
transmission mechanism of monetary disturbances to the real economy.18
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 4.  Japan: Response of Private Demand to Funding Shocks





18Responses of short-term interest rates are not reported as they were small and insignificant in the










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
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Figure 5.  Japan: Substitution Between Sources of Funding
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Table 3. Japan: Variance Decompositions for the Private Sector Funding Model
(In percent)
Variance Decomposition of Private Demand 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 0.9 71.0 1.9 1.4 20.7 1.7 0.9 2.6
8 1.2 40.3 2.6 1.3 42.8 2.8 0.5 9.6
12 1.5 40.5 2.8 0.9 37.9 6.9 0.6 10.4
16 1.7 42.8 2.8 1.6 30.8 12.5 0.9 8.6
Variance Decomposition of Price Level
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 0.5 18.2 74.4 0.6 0.1 6.1 0.3 0.3
8 0.7 30.0 50.3 2.1 3.7 9.2 4.0 0.7
12 0.8 24.0 37.8 5.0 11.7 8.7 7.4 5.4
16 0.9 29.4 29.3 4.6 13.0 6.3 7.6 9.7
Variance Decomposition of Interest Rates 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 0.6 17.4 8.3 60.0 10.7 0.4 2.7 0.5
8 0.8 12.4 6.9 40.0 24.9 0.4 13.8 1.5
12 0.9 16.1 10.7 31.5 24.4 1.7 14.3 1.4
16 1.0 20.0 11.2 26.7 21.7 6.6 12.3 1.5
Variance Decomposition of Broad Money
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 1.5 3.5 2.1 0.3 82.4 4.6 5.8 1.3
8 2.2 19.9 5.0 0.4 57.5 11.7 4.6 0.9
12 2.7 23.8 4.0 1.1 44.1 22.1 3.7 1.2
16 3.0 20.2 6.5 3.2 34.5 26.0 5.5 4.2
Variance Decomposition of Public Loans
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 0.3 9.3 3.3 3.6 3.9 78.2 1.6 0.0
8 0.6 22.2 8.4 4.3 14.7 42.9 7.2 0.3
12 0.8 21.4 10.2 3.6 24.6 29.8 10.0 0.3
16 0.8 19.9 12.3 3.5 26.2 25.1 12.7 0.3Bank Lending 
This section further examines the role of banks in the monetary transmission
mechanism by adding to the basic model the main components of bank assets,
namely loans and holdings of securities. Including banks’ balance sheets in the
analysis yields the following insights into the monetary transmission mechanism
in Japan: (i) shocks to bank loans have a positive and significant effect on private
demand, even controlling for interest rates and broad money; (ii) the impulse
responses of private demand to interest rate and money shocks are reduced when
bank loans are exogenized, suggesting that bank loans are an important transmis-
sion channel; and (iii) the addition of relative bank stock prices to the VAR
suggests that bank loan shocks may largely reflect innovations to bank strength.
The bank lending VAR includes private demand, prices, interest rates, broad
money, bank loans, and banks’ holdings of securities. The impulse responses for
the basic model variables are generally similar to the results reported previously,
with the overnight call rate having a significantly negative effect—and broad
money a significantly positive effect—on private demand (see Appendix II). The
response of private demand to a broad money shock is somewhat smaller than that
in the basic model, suggesting that part of the broad money shocks in the basic
model reflect bank lending shocks (top panel of Figure 6). Turning to the impact
of the additional variables on private demand, a shock to bank lending credit has
a positive and long-lasting effect—a  ¥100 increase in bank lending increases
private demand by almost ¥50—while shocks to securities have little short-term
impact (middle panel of Figure 6). The variance decompositions (Table 4) also
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Table 3. (concluded)
Variance Decomposition of Securities Markets Funding 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 0.6 9.7 14.0 2.1 16.8 1.0 55.9 0.5
8 1.0 27.7 20.3 3.2 11.1 2.8 34.0 0.9
12 1.2 36.8 17.9 2.1 8.7 11.0 22.8 0.8
16 1.4 34.5 14.4 2.6 7.9 21.6 18.0 0.9
Variance Decomposition of Bank Loans
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Public Capital Bank
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Markets Loans
4 1.7 9.0 3.8 0.6 42.1 5.3 9.7 29.7
8 2.9 29.1 4.6 0.5 29.1 11.6 6.6 18.4
12 3.7 34.3 3.1 0.6 22.7 22.1 4.4 12.7
16 4.3 28.2 4.1 1.8 20.8 31.8 3.6 9.7
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    Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 6.  Japan: Impulse Responses for Bank Lending Model
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Quarters
Responses to Broad Money Shocksshow that the addition of bank loans to the VAR reduces the fluctuation in private
demand that is accounted for by broad money shocks.
Bank loans and securities both respond negatively to an interest rate shock and
positively to a money shock (bottom panel of Figure 6).19 The fact that the imme-
diate reactions of bank loans and securities are so large, accounting for more than
four-fifths of the shock to broad money, shows that a shock to the main compo-
nent of bank funding (broad money) cannot be immediately offset with a change
in other liabilities. In turn, this suggests that banks do not face a perfectly elastic
supply of funds and thus need to make an immediate adjustment in assets. Our
results show that bank loans and securities respond in similar ways to monetary
shocks, which is not consistent with the idea that banks use their relatively liquid
James Morsink and Tamim Bayoumi
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Table 4. Japan: Variance Decompositions for the Bank Lending Model
(In percent)
Variance Decomposition of Private Demand 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Bank Securities
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Holdings
4 1.0 71.2 2.6 11.9 11.8 2.2 0.3
8 1.5 37.8 13.5 18.3 25.5 4.6 0.3
12 1.8 25.3 18.0 18.8 31.8 5.1 0.9
16 2.0 20.9 18.4 19.1 34.9 5.1 1.7
Variance Decomposition of Price Level 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Bank Securities
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Holdings
4 0.7 8.2 76.1 2.9 4.0 2.6 6.2
8 0.9 20.2 59.4 1.7 5.1 1.6 11.9
12 1.0 25.4 51.4 2.0 4.7 3.1 13.5
16 1.1 24.8 47.4 3.5 5.4 6.6 12.4
Variance Decomposition of Interest Rates 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Bank Securities
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Holdings
4 0.9 2.9 16.2 67.4 0.6 2.3 10.6
8 1.1 3.3 18.6 53.2 9.4 2.4 13.1
12 1.3 3.4 24.9 43.4 15.2 3.4 9.8
16 1.4 4.4 25.6 39.1 18.0 3.6 9.3
19When the VAR is run without broad money, the impulse responses of private demand to innovations
in bank loans and securities are somewhat larger, consistent with the view that these variables to some
extent capture money shocks.assets (securities) as a temporary shock absorber and adjust their loans over the
longer run, as they do in the United States.20
The role of bank loans in the transmission mechanism can be further exam-
ined by exogenizing bank loans in the calculation of the impulse responses.
Exogenizing bank loans sharply dampens the impulse response of private demand
to both interest rate and broad money shocks (Figure 7). Our results suggest that,
after two years, about two-thirds of the direct impact of a change in the overnight
call rate on private demand comes through bank loans. By contrast, exogenizing
securities holdings does not have these effects. These results indicate that bank
loans play an important role in transmitting interest rate and money shocks to
economic activity.
Given the importance of bank loans in determining activity, it is useful to try
to identify the nature of loan shocks, as distinct from interest rate and money
shocks. Motivated by the idea that bank weaknesses could be pushing banks to
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Table 4. (concluded)
Variance Decomposition of Broad Money 
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Bank Securities
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Holdings
4 2.1 0.5 20.0 9.5 67.4 1.3 1.4
8 3.5 1.7 25.6 14.5 55.5 2.2 0.6
12 4.2 3.0 25.6 15.4 52.6 2.4 1.1
16 4.5 3.4 24.4 15.8 52.5 2.3 1.6
Variance Decomposition of Bank Loans
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Bank Securities
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Holdings
4 1.6 0.8 23.2 11.2 45.6 18.5 0.8
8 2.8 0.3 22.2 17.7 41.6 14.4 3.8
12 3.6 0.2 18.9 19.8 41.4 13.3 6.4
16 4.1 0.3 16.0 21.4 42.0 12.7 7.5
Variance Decomposition of Securities Holdings
Forecast Private Price Interest Broad Bank Securities
Quarter Error Demand Level Rates Money Loans Holdings
4 0.8 1.0 24.4 5.3 40.2 5.3 23.8
8 1.2 2.9 30.4 10.1 40.8 5.8 10.0
12 1.5 4.0 29.8 12.0 40.4 6.2 7.6
16 1.7 4.0 27.5 13.2 41.0 6.3 8.1
Source: Authors’calculations.
20See Bernanke and Blinder (1992).contract lending (a credit crunch), we considered a market-based measure of bank
strength, namely the relative value of bank stocks to the overall TOPIX.21 When
added to the VAR, this variable does a good job of anticipating movements in bank
loans, and otherwise generates the anticipated pattern of responses. The impulse
response of private demand to bank strength is positive and significant. While
private demand still responds positively and significantly to a shock to bank loans,
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21Balance-sheet-based measures of bank strength, such as a bank’s reported capital adequacy ratio,
are suspect. For example, Long-Term Credit Bank reported a capital adequacy of over 10 percent for
March 1998, just a few months before it was found to have negative net worth equivalent to over 14
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    Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 7.  Japan: Role of Bank Loans in Transmitting Monetary Shocks




















Broad Money Shocksthe size of the response is now smaller. The responses of private demand to interest
rate and money shocks are smaller, indicating that part of the impact of such
shocks is captured by the measure of bank strength. While it is possible that banks
are particularly sensitive to private sector shocks, so a decline in their relative
value just reflects real developments, this sensitivity is already taken into account
by ordering bank strength last in the VAR, that is, shocks to bank strength are
orthogonal to private demand, prices, and money.
An interesting application of these results is to assess the likely impact of the
recent decision to inject public funds into major banks on private credit and real
demand. In the wake of the enactment of bank legislation in October 1998, which
established the framework for the capital injections that eventually occurred in
March 1999, bank stock prices recovered strongly—the bank strength variable
rose by about 5 percentage points between the third and fourth quarters of 1998.
In terms of the history of this variable, such an improvement is equivalent to a
typical (one standard deviation) shock to bank strength. If we attribute this
improvement exclusively to a previously unanticipated change in expectations
about public capital injections, the estimated results suggest that bank loans will
be about 0.5 percent of GDP higher than otherwise after about one year (and
private demand about 0.35 percent of GDP higher).
Summary Model 
We now run a single VAR that summarizes our key findings about the role of
banks in the monetary transmission mechanism, namely that banks are both a
significant source of independent shocks to private demand and an important
conduit for interest rate and broad money shocks. The summary VAR differs from
the basic model in two crucial aspects. First, reflecting the particular sensitivity of
business investment to monetary shocks, the summary VAR splits private demand
into business investment and the remainder of private demand. Second, the
summary VAR adds bank loans (ordered last).
The impulse responses of this model show that shocks to interest rates, broad
money, and bank loans all have large and significant effects on business invest-
ment and the remainder of private demand (Figure 8 and Appendix II). The reac-
tions to these shocks of business investment and the remainder of private demand
differ in two important ways: (i) the reactions of business investment are two to
three times larger, confirming that this component of private demand is particu-
larly sensitive to monetary shocks; and (ii) the reaction to any given shock of
business investment builds up more slowly than the reaction of the remainder of
private demand, reaching their peaks about one to two years later, which is
consistent with the idea that planning processes for business investment are
longer than for other components of private demand. The variance decomposi-
tions (Table 5) confirm that, after two years, the fraction of the fluctuation in
business investment accounted for by monetary factors is larger than that for the
remainder of private demand.
The fact that shocks to bank loans have positive and significant effects on
private demand, even controlling for interest rates and broad money, confirms that
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43banks play an important independent role in the monetary transmission mecha-
nism. This role of banks as lenders is distinct from that played by the monetary
authorities (who determine the overnight call rate) and economic agents more
broadly (who decide their demand for money). The fact that the impulse responses
of private demand to interest rate and money shocks are reduced when bank loans
are exogenized confirms that such shocks are transmitted—at least in part—
through bank loans, suggesting an important role for a bank lending channel.
Finally, we use the results of the summary VAR to decompose the actual path
of business investment from 1980 to 1998 into the part predicted by the exogenous
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    Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure 8.  Japan: Impulse Responses for Summary Model










Responses of Business Investment
Responses of Private Demand Minus Business Investmentvariables (constants, time trends, and dummies) and the remainder (the shock).
This total shock is then divided into the part explained by innovations in financial
variables (overnight call rate, broad money, and bank loans) and that explained by
innovations in “real” variables (remainder of private investment, business invest-
ment, and prices). The historical decomposition in Figure 9 shows quite nicely
how the bubble in the late 1980s was driven by both real factors (including animal
spirits) and financial shocks, while the recession of the early 1990s reflected the
reversal of both these sets of shocks. Conversely, the pickup in business invest-
ment in 1996–97, which helped Japan achieve the most rapid growth rate among
OECD countries in 1996, was driven exclusively by real factors, with financial
shocks remaining in negative territory. Similarly, the recent abrupt decline in busi-
ness investment reflects a reversal of these real factors, possibly owing to adverse
effects of the Asia crisis on confidence.22
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Table 5. Japan: Variance Decompositions for the Summary Model
(In percent)
Variance Decomposition of Private Demand Minus Business Investment
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad Bank
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money Loans
4 0.5 65.0 13.6 2.2 12.0 6.7 0.5
8 0.6 47.5 11.0 8.7 15.5 14.6 2.7
12 0.6 42.1 9.3 11.7 17.3 15.4 4.3
16 0.7 40.5 9.5 11.6 18.3 15.0 5.1
Variance Decomposition of Business Investment 
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad Bank
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money Loans
4 0.6 10.2 78.1 0.4 3.5 7.6 0.2
8 1.0 5.9 42.9 10.5 10.0 28.6 2.2
12 1.3 7.6 23.4 20.4 14.2 30.3 4.0
16 1.5 9.2 18.6 22.4 16.5 28.3 5.0
Variance Decomposition of Price Level 
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad Bank
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money Loans
4 0.7 7.7 0.7 82.7 4.6 0.9 3.5
8 0.9 12.5 3.0 74.8 5.9 0.8 3.1
12 1.0 13.1 5.3 69.8 5.7 3.1 3.0
16 1.0 11.7 6.1 63.0 7.5 7.7 4.1
22The results of the decomposition are similar if the VAR is reordered with the financial variables
preceding the real variables.Figure 9 also shows the individual components of the financial shocks to busi-
ness investment: the interest rate shock, the broad money shock, and the bank
loans shock. It is interesting that, at least according to our decomposition, interest
rate policy was not surprisingly expansionary during the late 1980s—rather, the
bubble was driven by money and loan shocks (possibly reflecting irrational
exuberance). The sharp swings in money demand in the early 1990s are difficult
to explain, but could reflect in part the public’s initial rush into bank deposits
(accompanying the collapse of asset prices) followed by the realization that banks
themselves were in difficulties. Although monetary policy has recently provided
some support to private demand, the public’s confidence in bank deposits (money
demand) and banks’willingness to lend (bank loans) remain weak, underlying the
urgency of further progress on bank restructuring. 
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Table 5. (concluded)
Variance Decomposition of Interest Rates 
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad Bank
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money Loans
4 1.0 2.8 0.1 23.3 71.4 0.9 1.6
8 1.1 4.2 1.1 24.0 56.6 12.5 1.6
12 1.3 7.6 1.2 28.7 42.4 18.1 2.1
16 1.5 9.4 1.1 29.9 39.4 19.0 2.3
Variance Decomposition of Broad Money
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad Bank
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money Loans
4 2.0 7.4 5.1 16.8 5.0 64.3 1.5
8 3.5 11.2 3.5 25.2 11.1 46.3 2.8
12 4.2 12.3 3.0 26.6 13.9 40.8 3.4
16 4.4 12.3 3.2 26.2 15.3 39.4 3.6
Variance Decomposition of Bank Loans
Forecast Other Business Price Interest Broad Bank
Quarter Error Activity Investment Level Rates Money Loans
4 1.6 3.8 9.7 26.7 9.9 30.3 19.6
8 2.9 4.2 8.8 27.1 19.9 23.8 16.2
12 3.6 3.6 9.5 24.5 24.3 21.5 16.7
16 4.0 2.9 11.0 21.5 26.6 20.1 17.8
Source: Authors’calculations.III. Conclusions
This paper has used a series of VARs to examine the transmission of monetary
shocks to real activity—the so-called black box—in Japan. Starting from a rela-
tively simple specification which describes the overall mechanism, the role of the
components of private demand, private sector funding, and bank lending were
examined in turn by including relevant additional variables. Finally, a summary
VAR was estimated which captures our main findings. The results of these exer-
cises point to a transmission mechanism dominated by banks, in which bank
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Decomposition of Financial Shocklending is both an important independent source of shocks and an important
conduit for the transmission of interest rate and broad money shocks to real
activity. According to our results, after two years about two-thirds of the direct
impact of a change in the overnight call rate on private demand comes through
bank loans, and that of this change in private demand about two-thirds comes
through business investment. In a further experiment, we found that changes in
the monetary base had relatively limited effects on real private demand,
suggesting that in normal circumstances quantitative easing may provide limited
benefits to activity.
The importance of bank loans in financial intermediation appears to reflect the
lack of alternative sources of borrowing for much of the nonfinancial private sector,
with neither securities markets nor loans from government financial institutions
providing a significant offset to changes in bank loans. In addition, independent
disturbances to bank credit also appear to have a significant impact on private
demand, and much of this effect can be captured by a measure of bank strength
based on equity prices. By contrast, the potential benefits from increased loans by
the public sector are negated by offsetting decreases in private sector credit.
The important independent role of bank loans in determining activity points to
the fact that banking strains may have undermined the monetary transmission
mechanism over the last few years. To the extent that banks have responded to
their own difficulties by reducing their loans to the private sector, such behavior
will have tended to offset the benefits of monetary easing. Indeed, the historical
decomposition of the summary VAR shows that, while unanticipated monetary
loosening has had a positive effect on business investment recently, shocks to bank
loans have dragged down business investment, especially since 1996. We argue
that bank weaknesses explain a large part of the negative shocks to bank loans.
Looking to the future, the increasing role of private securities markets in
financial intermediation likely to be created by the Big Bang financial deregula-
tion initiative may well reduce the central role of banks in Japan’s financial
system, although such changes are likely to be gradual rather than rapid, particu-
larly given the importance of small companies in Japan’s industrial structure. In
the meantime, the results from this paper suggest that restoring the banking system




Aggregate demand: Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts.
Consumer price index, broad money, base money, bank loans, bank holdings of securities,
overnight call rate, average lending rate on new bank loans: Bank of Japan, Economic
Statistics Monthly.
Corporate and household funding: Bank of Japan, Flow of Funds Accounts, Economic Statistics
Monthly.
Bank strength: Tokyo Stock Exchange (First Section) banking sector index divided by
composite index (TOPIX).
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48APPENDIX II
Impulse Response Functions of Models
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Figure A1. Japan: Impulse Response Functions for the Basic Model
(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP = Private demand      CPI = Consumer price index
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Response of M2 to LOG(CPI)
Figure A2.  Japan: Impulse Response Functions for the Private Sector Funding Model
(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP = Private demand  CPI = Consumer price index  OCR = Overnight call rate  M2 = Broad money   





































































Figure A2.  (concluded)
(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP = Private demand  CPI = Consumer price index  OCR = Overnight call rate  M2 = Broad money   
PGFI = Loans from government financial institutions   CM = Capital market financing  PBKPV = Loans from private banks
Response of PGFI to YP Response of PGFI to OCR Response of PGFI to M2 Response of PGFI to PGFI Response of PGFI to CM
Response of PGFI
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Response of PGFI 
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Figure A3. Japan: Impulse Response Functions for the Bank Lending Model
(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP = Private demand CPI = Consumer price index OCR = Overnight call rate M2 = Broad money
LOAN = Bank loans SEC = Banks’ holdings of securities
Response of YP to YP Response of YP to OCR Response of YP to M2 Response of YP to LOAN Response of YP to SEC Response of YP to LOG(CPI)
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(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP = Private demand CPI = Consumer price index OCR = Overnight call rate M2 = Broad money
LOAN = Bank loans SEC = Banks’ holdings of securities
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Figure A4.  Japan: Impulse Response Functions for the Summary Model
(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP–BI = Private demand minus business investment  BI = Business investment  CPI = Consumer price index
OCR = Overnight call rate  M2 = Broad money  LOAN = Bank loans
Response of YP-BI to YP-BI
Response of YP-BI
to LOG(CPI) Response of YP-BI to OCR Response of YP-BI to M2 Response of YP-BI to LOAN Response of YP-BI to BI
Response of BI to YP-BI
Response of BI
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Figure A4.  (concluded)
(Response to One S.D. Innovations ±  2 S.E.)
YP–BI = Private demand minus business investment  BI = Business investment  CPI = Consumer price index
OCR = Overnight call rate  M2 = Broad money  LOAN = Bank loans
Response of OCR to YP-BI
Response of OCR
to LOG(CPI) Response of OCR to OCR Response of OCR to M2 Response of OCR to LOAN Response of OCR to BI
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Exogenizing a Variable
Consider the three-variable VAR:
xt = α 1xt–1 + β 1yt–1 + γ 1 zt–1
yt = α 2xt–1 + β 2yt–1 + γ 2 zt–1
zt = α 3xt–1 + β 3yt–1 + γ 3 zt–1
We exogenize the variable z by running a two-variable VAR with z as an exogenous variable:
xt = α 1xt–1 + β 1yt–1 + γ 1 zt–1
yt = α 2xt–1 + β 2yt–1 + γ 2 zt–1
This procedure generates a VAR in which the first two equations are identical to the orig-
inal VAR. However, the impulse response functions will be different because any interaction
between these variables that passes through z will be blocked (because it is exogenous). Hence,
comparisons of the two sets of impulse response functions provides a measure of the impor-
tance of the variable z in the transmission mechanism.
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